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LEGISLATIVE DIVORCES AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT.
PRIOR to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, it was the prevailing
opinion of lawyers and courts that state legislatures could giant
divorces a vinculo when the constitution of their state did not
forbid, at least for causes for which they could not be granted by
the courts.
Marriage was viewed as creating or entailing a legal status.
The law produced the status, and the law could terminate it. The
voice of the state was its law, whether pronounced'by the legis-
lative or the judicial department, so long as each acted in its proper
sphere.
The history of the common law supported this doctrine. Great
Britain had, during a course of centuries, granted divorces occa-
sionally by act of Parliament. They had been confined to cases of
adultery; but such a limitation was in its nature purely a matter
of legislative discretion.
The Supreme Court of the United States in 1887* supported
(though two of its ablest members dissented) a divorce given by
one of our territorial legislatures. The law under which the terri-
tory was organized vested it with legislative jurisdiction over
"all rightful subjects of legislation." English and American prac-
tice, the court said, had settled it that to grant a divorce a sin-
culo was a proper act of legislation, at least where no jurisdiction
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to grant one under similar circumstances had been vested in the
judicial tribunals.'
The general current of state decisions runs in the same direction,"
although a few are -to the- contraryr.
2
The number of legislative -divorces granted in the various states
has been very large, but of late years it has been much reduced by
new piovisions-ni ofif state constitutions or statutes. For the five
biennial' sessions of the Delaware legislature, from 1889 to 1897
inclusive, it is stated in a recent book that there were over three
hundred of them, tlie last year of the period being the most
'pr6lific, and showing a round hundred.3 Ten years later, by a
ostatute of 1907, divorces in all cases were turned over to the courts.
4
In Missouri, in one year, the legislature granted fifty-five divorces,
hIthough the courts had been given quite a broad divorce juris-
diction.5  Pennsylvania had at one time a standing legislative
Committee on Divorce, which heard petitions for divorce, much as
a'court might. In that state the court took the explicit position
thif notice of a divorce proceeding pending~in, or brought to, the
legislature need -not be given to the adverse-'party: The power
to give relief, it said, was legislative, and so "the judicial quality
of the Act is merged. ' Notice becomes unnecessary, because it is a
law, and not a decree." 
6
* It seems: difficult, 'on principle, to treat a legislative divorce
as-invalid, where the legislature had previously given the courts
jurisdiction over divorces for certain' cai'ses, or even exclusive
jurisdicti6nas to such causes; and yet as valid, if 'the courts had re-'
ceived no such grants. Professor Howard, in his History of Mat-
rimonial Ifistitutions, asserts such a distinction,7 but his main
authority for it-is the divorce practice in Connecticut. As shown
by-him, legislative divorces were' numerous in that state down to
1850. - In 1843, forrinstance, there were thirteen; in 1847, seven;
,4. aynard'v. Hill, .125 U. S.,Igo, 205,.2o6, 8 Sup. Ct. 723 (1888). See, however,
I Bishop on Divorce, § 66 ..
2 Bryson v. Bryson, 17 Mo. 590 (1853).
- Keezer on Marriage and Divorce, 418.
4. Laws of Delawaie, xxiv, 62r.
5 Page onDivorce, 58, note, as cited,in i Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, p. soo,
note.
-76 Cronise v. Crofiise, 54'Ta. St. 255, 262 (i867).
7 , 3 9 "
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in 1848, fifteen; and in 1849, eighteen. In the latter'year a differ-
ent policy was adopted for the future. The Superior Court was
given "sole and exclusive jurisdiction of all petitions for divorce,"
and several new causes of divorce were added, one being "any such
misconduct of the other party as permanently destroys the happi-
ness of the petitioner and defeats the purpose of the marriage
relation." s Notwithstanding this, the General Assembly, at its
next session, granted a divorce, and occasionally exercised the same
jurisdiction for the next sixty years. The causes of divorce were
very rarely stated in the final Act. In a majority of the cases,
probably, it was insanity existing previous to the marriage, but this
was treated as strictly a cause of divorce, and not of a judgment
of nullity. Nor had it, from 1831 (when Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn.
541, was decided) to 1911, been regarded as an intrusion on the
judicial field for the legislature to grant such relief in any case
where it deemed it proper. Each Act of divorce, if inconsistent
with the Act of 1849 giving exclusive jurisdiction in divorce suits
to the courts, was supported as a later law, granting exceptions
from a former one.
At the time of the adoption ol the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, in i868, its far-reaching
scope was not generally understood or, at least, not generally ad-
mitted. The Supreme Court of the United States was at first indis-
posed to give it all the effect which its terms naturally called for,
and, had the opinion expressed in the Slaughter House cases 9
not been virtually overruled in later decisions, the amendment
would have been of little avail to any but the negro. So far as the
writer is aware, no court has yet been asked to consider its effect
on legislative divorces."
The clause of most importance in this respect is that forbidding
any state to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 0 this phrase - "the equal protection
of the laws" -was defined as meaning "the protection of equal
laws." This would seem to preclude a state, whose courts have gen-
8 Public Acts of 1849, 17.
16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 8r (1872).
10 118 U. S. 356, 369, 8 Sup. Ct. io64 (I886).
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eral jurisdiction to grant divorces for certain causes, from singling
out, by a special law, a particular couple who are united in the
marriage relation, and divorcing them for another cause, or, indeed,
for any cause. Here would be a general law for all, and a special
law for two named individuals. If a man sued in court for a divorce,
it could be obtained only by a decree of a judicial tribunal, before
which his wife must be summoned, and where she could be heard
in her own behalf. If the special law be valid, he could sue before
the legislature without notifying her, and secure the divorce when
she had no knowledge of the proceeding and no opportunity to
appear in opposition. The status of no one else in the general class
of married women could be varied by her exclusion from that class
without her having the benefit of a judicial hearing. The status
of the one particular woman, from whom her husband was freed
by special legislative action, would be altered in a manner much
less apt to secure h~r just rights.
The ordinary married person has by law, in almost every state,
a conditional immunity from divorce. None can be granted, ac-
cording to that law, save by a court. If any particular married
person can be singled out by the state and freed from the bond
of matrimony, without any court proceeding, the conditional im-
munity belonging to every other married person is denied.
The protection of equal laws cannot be enjoyed by one against
whom the power of the state is exerted to alter his status in a
particular manner not contemplated or permitted by such laws, as
respects persons in general.
The guaranty in the Fourteenth Amendment against discrim-
ination by the state is for the benefit of "any person within its
jurisdiction." As a legislative divorce, if valid, operates as a law,
and as the general proposition is true that laws can be made without
notice to those who will be affected by them, it was the former
American doctrine that such a divorce proceeding could be main-
tained where one party to the marriage was domiciled in the
state where it was had, though the other was domiciled elsewhere
and did not have notice or appear." So far, however, as the Four-
11 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 2o9, 8 Sup. Ct. 723 (i888). Congress, in i886,
forbade territorial legislative divorces for the future. U. S. STAT. AT LARGE, 2x1v,
170.
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teenth Amendment operates on personal rights and matters of
status, it can hardly be claimed that it protects no one who is not
personally within the territory of the state. Should a state deny to
such a person, who is not one of its citizens, the equal protection
of its laws, by changiag his status, both in respect to one of its cit-
izens and to the community, it assumes to have jurisdiction over
him by that very denial. If the proceeding has any force what-
ever, it is because of this assumption, and if a non-resident is thus
swept into the de facto jurisdiction of a legislature, he certainly
comes within the spirit of the amendment.'2
In 1911 the legislature of Connecticut granted a divorce on the
husband's petition. The wife had become incurably insane since
her marriage. The divorce was not to take effect until he gave a
bond, with surety for $I5oo, to the town where he lived, condi-
tioned for her partial support. The Superior Court had no power
to grant divorces for the cause of supervenient insanity. The
Governor returned the bill without his approval, and his veto,
which was mainly based on the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, was sustained. Adverse reports have been made on all
subsequent applications for divorces made to the legislature in
ii and 1913.
The doctrine of Maynard v. Hill 1 was explained in Haddock v.
Haddock 14 as only affirming that a legislative divorce of a dom-
iciled citizen was valid within the jurisdiction of the government
which granted it. Other states were free to recognize it as effec-
tual or not.
It is certain that it would not be entitled to their recognition
under the generally accepted rules of international private law. 5
In Maynard v. Hill 6 the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment
on the states was not in question. It was a question purely of the
rights of the United States, exercised through 6ne of its political
1 See, however, Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 261, i9 Sup. Ct. 165 (1898);
176 U. S. 59, 65, 20 Sup. Ct. 307 (19oo).
23 Supra.
14 201 U. S. 562, 569, 574, 26 Sup. Ct. 525 (i9o6).
1 See Wharton on the Conflict of Laws, 3 ed., I, § 237, f; Convention pour rdgler les
Conflits de Lois et de Juridictions ez Mat ire de Divorce et de S&paration de Corps,
Art. 7.
is Supra.
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agencies- a territorial government- and affecting landed prop-
erty situated in the territory.
The whole drift of modern institutions is away from unconfined
legislative power. The grant of legislative divorce is one of the
extremist forms which it can assume. It does not belong to the
social life of the twentieth century.
Simeon E. Baldwin.
NEW HAVEN.
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